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more sophisticated analysis. Novel methods or artifices, regardless of
form, should not provide immunity from securities laws.4 6 To limit the
role of "in connection with" to active purchasers or sellers is an omis-
sion to discover whether those investors, who remained inactive as a
result of concealment of the scheme, were the real victims of the de-
ception. The purchase or sale should be recognized only as the necessary
vehicle in the type of fraud which is under the jurisdiction of a section
10(b) or rule 10(b)-(5) cause of action. But it is those victims of the
fraud, whether or not defrauded purchasers or sellers, "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of securities who must be recognized as pro-
tected within the boundaries of the Act.
Alan C. Klein
DAMAGES-PERSONAL INJURY-INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON FEDERAL
INCOME TAx-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit has held that in personal injury actions trial courts must instruct
the jury, upon request of counsel, that any award is not subject to federal
income taxes, and therefore, it should not add or subtract taxes in fixing
the amount of such award.
Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Company, 443 F.2d 1245 (3d
Cir. 1971).
Domeracki, a longshoreman, sustained personal injuries while loading
Humble's ship. He brought an action in federal district court alleging
the ship was unseaworthy. Humble requested the trial court instruct
the jury that if any award were made it would not be subject to federal
income taxes.' The court refused to give the instruction; judgment was
entered on a jury verdict in favor of the longshoreman, and the ship-
owner appealed contending, inter alia, that the refusal resulted in
prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial. Although it refused to re-
46. A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
1. Humble submitted the following charge which the trial court refused:
I charge you, as a matter of law, that any award made to the plaintiff in this case,
if any is made, is not income to the plaintiff within the meaning of the federal
income tax law. Should you find that plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages,
then you are to follow the instructions already given to you by this Court in measuring
those damages, and in no event should you either add to or subtract from that award
on account of federal income taxes.
Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 124849 (3d Cir. 1971).
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verse the decision of the district court, the court of appeals held that in
future personal injury actions such an instruction must be given upon
request of counsel.
In tort actions the primary purpose of the damage award is to com-
pensate the injured party by payment of a sum of money which, ideally,
will restore him to the position he would have been in if the wrong had
not been committed.2 The Internal Revenue Code specifically excludes
from gross income "the amount of any damages received (whether by
suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness."3 Given
the compensatory purpose of the damage award and this specific ex-
clusion, defense attorneys have raised two separate issues in personal
injury and wrongful death actions. First, in litigation involving loss of
earnings as an element of damages they have argued that evidence of
plaintiff's income tax liability ought to be admitted so that estimated
net earnings (plaintiff's actual loss) will be used to calculate the loss.
Secondly, they have asked the court to charge the jury on the tax-exempt
status of the award in order to prevent any increase in the award, by the
jury, to compensate for nonexistent taxes.
The first, or evidentiary issue arises during a trial in which plaintiff
is claiming a loss of earnings because of the injury. The question is
whether plaintiff should have lost earnings measured by the gross income
evidence he introduces, or whether the defendant should be able to
establish estimated net income after taxes which represents the actual
loss. 4 Despite the apparent conflict with the compensatory theory of
damages, a majority of courts considering the problem have adhered to a
gross income approach, refusing to use net income as the measure of
recovery.5 The reason most frequently relied upon to justify a gross
income approach is that estimating income tax liability on estimated
earnings is too speculative,6 although other even less persuasive reasons
2. Russell v. Wildwood, 428 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1970).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 104(a)(2). Damages received under state wrongful death
statutes are also tax exempt. Rev. Rul. 19, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 179. See Anderson v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
4. See Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 212, 219
(1958), where the author suggests that evidence on plaintiff's tax liability could be intro-
duced by cross-examination of the plaintiff, introduction of prior income tax returns, or
questioning the actuary who has testified on the present worth of future income.
5. Scruggs v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Va. 1970) (wrongful
death); Gushen v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 280 A.2d 708 (Del. 1971) (wrongful death);
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Miller, 486 P.2d 630 (Okla. 1971) (personal injury); Girard
Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 530, 190 A.2d 293 (1963)
(wrongful death). See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393 § 4 (1959).
6. Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944) (personal injury); Abele v.
Massi, 273 A.2d 260, 261 (Del. 1970) (wrongful death).
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sometimes appear.7 The speculation argument loses much of its force
when used to justify calculation of lost earnings, which arise prior to
trial, with gross income. In the latter case, once plaintiff establishes what
he would have earned, his income tax liability can be computed using
known tax rates, exemptions, and deductions.8 The speculation argu-
ment is only slightly more appealing when impairment of future earn-
ings or earning capacity is considered, since the income tax factor is no
more uncertain, speculative or conjectural than many of the other
factors the jury considers. 9 Although the majority's use of gross income
has been roundly criticized by writers,1 ° only a minority of courts have
adopted a net income rule."
7. These other arguments have little current vitality and have been persuasively refuted
by several writers; for that reason they shall not be treated here. See Burns, A Compen-
sation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death Is Tax-Exempt: Should We Tell The
Jury? 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 320, 321-24 (1965); Feldman, Personal Injury Awards: Should
Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored? ARtz. L. Rxv. 272, 273-78 (1966); Nordstrom, supra note
4, at 215-30. Recent cases have disposed of the earnings issue by simply stating that the
majority of jurisdictions do not allow evidence of income tax liability to be admitted
and/or that such liability is too speculative. See, e.g., Gushen v. Penn Central Transp. Co.,
280 A.2d 708 (Del. 1971) (wrongful death); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Miller, 486 P.2d
630 (Okla. 1971) (personal injury). The former proposition hardly constitutes persuasive
judicial reasoning. The latter proposition is equally unacceptable since judicial scrutiny
would reveal persuasive authority to the contrary. See notes 8 and 9 infra and accompany-
ing text.
8. Simpson v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 296 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (wrongful
death); Petition of Oskar Tiedemann and Co., 236 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1964) (personal
injury and wrongful death); Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alas. 1967) (personal injury).
See Nordstrom, supra note 4, at 226. But cf. Comment, Income Taxes and The Computa-
tion of Lost Future Earnings in Wrongful Death and Personal Injury Cases, 29 MD. L. REv.
177, 185 (1969).
9. Moffa v. Perkins, 200 F. Supp. 183, 188 (D. Conn. 1961). In Brooks v. United States,
273 F. Supp. 619, 629 (D. S.C. 1967), the court stated: "Assuredly, the incidence of future
income taxes is no more 'guess work' and no more difficult of exact calculation than
possible future advancement, wage increases, and inflation, all matters to be taken into
account in calculating future income." See Nordstrom, supra note 4, at 226-27.
10. Feldman, supra note 7, at 272-78; II HARPER & JAMEs, THE LAW oF ToRTs § 25.12
(1956); Morris and Nordstrom, Personal Inury Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax
Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274, 276-77 (1960); Nordstrom, supra note 5, at 218-30. Contra, Com-
ment, Income Tax Effects on Personal Injury Recoveries, 30 LA. L. REv. 672 (1970); Page,
Comments On Recent Railroad Cases, 26-27 NACCA L.J. 294 (1961).
11. The net income rule has been most readily accepted in wrongful death actions.
Hartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969); Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp.
254 (D. Utah 1968); Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D. S.C. 1967); Furumizo v.
United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965); Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144
Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957); Adams v. Duer, 173 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1969). There is
some authority for using net income in personal injury actions, see McWeeney v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960)
where the court stated that when the question was one of federal law, or where applicable
state law was silent, a deduction of income taxes from prospective income in either per-
sonal injury or wrongful death cases would be appropriate when the relevant income was
high but not when it was at the lower or middle end of the income spectrum. For sub-
sequent application of the rule by the Second Circuit see note 32 infra and the authorities
cited therein. Accord, Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970);
Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967); Plant v. Simmons Co., 321




The second issue which arises as a result of the tax-exempt status of
the award is whether the jury should be instructed on its nontaxability.
This issue might arise independently and regardless of the loss of earn-
ings issue. 12 The purpose of the instruction is to obviate a possible
misconception on the part of the jury which might lead to an unwar-
ranted increase in the award by the jury to compensate for nonexistent
taxes. Such an increase would be improper regardless of whether the
jurisdiction followed a gross or or net income approach to the loss of
earnings issue and regardless of the elements comprising the damage
award.' 3 Following the lead of Hall v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry,14
a majority of courts have disapproved of the instruction.' 5 Reasons
relied upon in denying the requested instruction' include the pos-
sibility that it might prejudice the plaintiff; 17 that it introduces a
collateral matter into the damage issue;' 8 and that it is based upon the
unjustified assumption that the jury will not follow the court's instruc-
tions on the measure of damages.' 9 The leading case supporting an in-
12. See Feldman, supra note 7; Nordstrom, supra note 4. That these two issues are
independent is evident in Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 338, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), a
personal injury action in which the court explicitly rejected a net earnings approach to
the loss of earnings issue but also considered and approved of an instruction on the non-
taxability of the award.
13. Feldman, supra note 7, at 279.
14. 5 111. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). The issue was considered by the court because
of defense counsel's remarks, in his closing argument to the jury, that the award would
not be subject to federal income tax.
15. Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 271 A.2d 94 (1970); Kawa-
moto v. Yasutake, 49 Haw. 42, 410 P.2d 976 (1966); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.,
186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18 (1960). See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393 § 6 (1959).
16. For critical analysis of other arguments which have at various times been raised
against the propriety of an instruction see Burns, supra note 7; Morris and Nordstrom,
supra note 10; and Roettger, The Cautionary Instruction on Income Taxes in Negligence
Actions, 18 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 1 (1961).
17. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry, 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955). Supposedly
an instruction on the award's tax-exempt status might lead the jury to subtract from
the award or to hold down its size, thus resulting in a smaller verdict than would appear
without the instruction. See generally Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp.
97, 98 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Burns, supra note 7, at 330-31. But see Feldman, supra note 7, at
281: "It (the instruction) does not attempt to take away from the plaintiff any damages to
which he is entitled. Telling a jury the law and admonishing it not to add or to subtract
from the award should not be expected to stimulate the jury to reduce the award."
18. Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Haw. 42, 51, 410 P.2d 976, 981 (1966). This argument
might be used in one of two ways. It might be used to mean that taxes are irrelevant to
the damage issue. This proposition overlooks the compensatory purpose of the damage
award. II HARPER & JAMES, supra note 10, at 1327. The other intended meaning might be
that an instruction on the award's tax-exempt status would inject an issue (taxes) which
the jury would otherwise not consider. The tax-consciousness of the American public
warrants the conclusion that the tax question would probably arise anyway. See Dempsey
v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 338, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952); Morris and Nordstrom, supra note 10,
at 275; Roettger, supra note 16, at 12.
19. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 150, 125 N.E.2d 77, 85 (1955); accord,
Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 581, 271 A.2d 94, 97 (1970).
It is certainly valid to assume that the jury will not intentionally ignore the court's
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come tax instruction is Dempsey v. Thompson.20 After noting the tax
consciousness of most citizens and the general ignorance of the award's
exemption from taxation, the court approved of the instruction stating:
"Surely, the plaintiff has no right to receive an enhanced award due to a
possible and, we think, probable misconception on the part of a jury
that the amount allowed by it will be reduced by income taxes." 21 Al-
though only a minority of courts considering the problem have approved
of the instruction,2 it has received support from several writers on the
ground that if properly worded it will not confuse the jury, complicate
the trial, or prejudice the plaintiff.2
In Domeracki the court was faced with the second issue, the propriety
of an instruction on the tax-exempt status of the award. After dis-
tinguishing the evidentiary and instruction issues the court held that in
future personal injury actions24 "trial courts in this circuit must . . .
upon request by counsel, instruct the jury that any award will not be
instructions; however, the jury might in good faith add an amount for taxes, after calcu-
lating the award on the reasonable assumption that the award will be taxed. Comment,
Personal Injury Awards and the Nonexistent Income Tax-What is the Proper Jury
Charge? 26 FoRD L. REv. 98, 101 (1957). Consider Morris and Nordstrom, supra note 10,
at 275:
This is the crux of the problem. Can we assume that the jury will follow the general
charge and leave behind its common knowledge of tax impact? Or is it more logical to
believe that taxes are so commonly known that it becomes necessary to caution the
members of the jury that the money given in this case is "different" in that it is
probably the only example they will ever know of non-taxed dollars?
That juries do in fact consider the award's taxability is manifest in cases where it specif-
ically asks the court whether the plaintiff would be liable for income taxes on the award.
In Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18, 25 (1960), the court
held it was not reversible error for the trial court to additionally instruct the jury, upon
its specific inquiry, that it was not to consider whether the award would be taxable. In
Towli v. Ford Motor Co. 30 App. Div. 2d 319, 292 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1968) the court granted a
new trial on the issue of damages because the trial judge answered the jury's specific
inquiry about the award's taxability by stating he could not answer since the law did not
permit him to instruct on income taxes. The court stated that this answer left the jury
in a state of confusion and that the trial judge should have at least instructed the jury
that it could not consider income taxes in determining the award.
Instructing the jury not to consider taxes after they have already done so really begs
the question. In such situations the most forthright and least confusing approach would
be to answer simply and directly that under the law the award is not taxable.
20. 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), overruling Hilton v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 177,
227 S.W.2d 675 (1950).
21. 363 Mo. at 346, 251 S.W.2d at 45.
22. Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (wrongful
death); State Highway Dep't v. Buzzuto, 264 A.2d 347 (Del. 1970) (wrongful death); Poirer
v. Shireman, 129 So. 2d 439 (Fla. App. 1961) (personal injury). See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d
1393 § 6 (1959).
23. See Burns, supra note 7; Morris and Nordstrom, supra note 10; Nordstrom supra
note 4; Roettger, supra note 16.
24. There would appear to be no reason why the court would not extend the rule to
cover wrongful death awards which are also tax-exempt, since its only purpose is to prevent
an arbitrary increase in the award, by the jury, to compensate for nonexistent taxes. In
fact, one court has held failure to give the instruction in a wrongful death action was
reversible error. State Highway Dep't v. Buzzuto, 264 A.2d 347 (Del. 1970).
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subject to federal income taxes, and that the jury should not, therefore,
add or subtract taxes in fixing the amount of any award."' 25 The court
gave as its reasons for adopting the rule, the absence of complications
the instruction would engender, the tax consciousness of the American
public, and the general lack of knowledge about the statutory exclu-
sion.26
Theoretically the damage award should be the juridical expression of
a value equal to the plaintiff's actual loss. Domeracki is consonant with
this compensatory theory since the required instruction is designed to
obviate arbitrary increases in the award which divorce the sum ulti-
mately received from the actual loss, thus frustrating the award's com-
pensatory purpose.
Approval of the instruction, as the court readily recognized, is not
dispositive of the first, or evidentiary issue which also arises as a result
of the income tax exemption. It is suggested that when this compli-
mentary earnings issue is presented justice and consistency with its
present decision should lead the court to approve of a net earnings
approach. Justice requires that defendant only be required to replace
plaintiff's actual loss; when gross income is used to measure the loss of
earnings element in the award formula plaintiff benefits at defendant's
expense.27 Moreover, approval of a net earnings approach would be
consistent with the present decision requiring the instruction. If it is
desirable to limit the award to the sum of the elements recognized as
compensable, the next logical step is to limit the elements comprising
the award to amounts actually lost, i.e., net earnings within the context
of the two issues raised by the award's tax-exempt status. A net earnings
approach, in conjunction with the approved instruction, would aid in
rendering a still truer compensatory figure.
Only a minority of jurisdictions have approved of an instruction on
the award's nontaxability2s and, of these, those that have had the ad-
ditional opportunity to pass upon the loss of earnings issue have balked
25. 443 F.2d at 1251 (emphasis added). Generally, the giving of a cautionary instruction
is within the discretion of the trial court. Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp.
97 (S.D. Cal. 1960). By holding that trial courts must issue the instruction upon request,
the court has apparently obviated the trial court's discretion and would consider refusal
to give the instruction reversible error. Only one other court has taken this position;
State Highway Dep't v. Buzzuto, 264 A.2d 347 (Del. 1970) (wrongful death).
26. 443 F.2d at 1251.
27. "The argument for computing damages on estimated income after taxes is a clear
one: this will measure the actual loss. If plaintiff gets, in tax free damages, an amount on
which he would have had to pay taxes if he had gotten it as wages, then plaintiff is getting
more than he lost." II HARPER & JAMES, supra note 10, at 1326.
28. See note 22 supra.
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at adopting net earnings as a general rule.29 Only the Second Circuit
has approved of both an instruction on the award's tax-exempt status and
a net income approach. In McWeeney v. New York, New Haven, and
Hartford R.R.,3 0 the court held that an instruction would have been
proper if given by the trial court but its refusal was not reversible error.
In the same case the court promulgated the rule that gross income
should be the measure of recovery in all cases except those where the
relevant income was highA1 The court's reasons for using gross income
as a general rule were expediency and compensation. The court reasoned
that estimation of future tax liability was too conjectural, and also that
in the majority of cases, at the lower and middle end of the income
spectrum, use of gross income would not result in overcompensation of
the plaintiff because of the erosionary effect on the award of contingent
attorney fees, continuing inflation, and the tax payable on the income
earned from the award.32 Apparently, when an exceptional case arose in
which the relevant income was high3 a deduction would be called for
since overcompensation would be more likely, and the speculation con-
cerning income tax liability less onerous.8 4
Two other jurisdictions have approved of an instruction, but have
declined to adopt a net earnings approach. Both Missouri3 5 and Del-
29. On the other hand, Connecticut which was responsible for the landmark decision
approving of a net earnings approach in Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136
A.2d 918 (1957), subsequently declined to approve of an instruction on the award's tax-
exempt status in Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 271 A.2d 94 (1970).
30. 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir..) (en banc), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
31. 282 F.2d at 38-39. See note 11 supra.
32. Id. at 37-38.
33. In McWeeney the court denied a deduction for income taxes. The annual income
was only $4800. It has subsequently disallowed the deduction in Petition of Marina
Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966) (annual income between $9300
and $11,500); and Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S and M/S Trolleggen, 333 F.2d
308 (2d Cir. 1964) (annual income of $6300). The court approved of a deduction in Le Roy
v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878
(1965) (annual income of $16,000). See Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A.,
supra at 126; Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 631 n.18 (D. S.C. 1967). The ap-
proach of the Second Circuit is traced and critically evaluated in Comment, supra note 8.
34. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960):
In such cases (high income), which in proportion are relatively few, the criticism that
the whole process of computation is unrealistic has a considerable measure of validity,
the projection of future income at such levels being itself extremely conjectural ...
Such cases are in sharp contrast to the great mass of litigation at the lower or middle
reach of the income scale, where future income is fairly predictable, added exemptions
or deductions drastically affect the tax and, for the reasons indicated plantiff is almost
certain to be undercompensated for the loss of earning power in any event.
35. In Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), the court considered
both issues. Although it rendered the landmark decision approving of the instruction, it
declined to adopt a net earnings approach stating: "as a matter of necessity, the general
rule that an award of damages for loss of future earnings should be based strictly on actual
pecuniary loss cannot be rigidly adhered to insofar as it may be impossible to compute
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aware36 have refused to abandon the gross income approach solely for
the expedient reason that determination of future income tax liability is
too speculative. No compensatory justifications were even advanced.
It is evident that courts which have approved of an instruction on the
award's tax-exempt status have used a standard of compensation and/or
expediency when evaluating the complimentary loss of earnings issue.
The court in Domeracki also used both compensation and expediency
as its standard in evaluating the merits of the instruction. It seems
likely that when the loss of earnings issue is subsequently presented,
the court will employ this same standard of evaluation. It is submitted
that if this standard is used the court should abandon the present gross
earnings approach and adopt a net earnings rule.
-The only compensatory justification for adhering to a gross income
approach is that plaintiff is not overcompensated because of the ero-
sionary factors cited in McWeeney. The general criticism of using gross
income to compensate for these offsetting factors is, that if direct pro-
vision is not made for them, the use of gross income in calculating the
loss of earnings element is a poor substitute. It compensates for these
factors haphazardly, inprecisely, and in favor of plaintiffs with large
incomes. 38 Although the McWeeney approach circumvents this latter
criticism by allowing a deduction when the relevant income is high it
is still unacceptable. The only benefit this approach has over a complete
gross earnings approach comes at the expense of the higher income
plaintiff. If it is desirable to compensate the lower and middle income
with reasonable accuracy the amount of income tax liability that may attach thereto."
Id. at 345-46, 251 S.W.2d at 45.
36. In State Highway Dep't v. Buzzuto, 264 A.2d 347 (Del. 1970), the court held
that the trial court's refusal to give the instruction in a wrongful death action was
reversible error. In Abele v. Massi, 273 A.2d 260, 260-61 (Del. 1970) the court rejected the
net earnings approach to the loss of earnings issue in a wrongful death action stating:
It is of course true that since the proper purpose of an award of damages is to
compensate adequately a plaintiff for what he has been deprived of, this could be
more fairly accomplished by considering net rather than gross income when loss of
earnings is being considered. However, to try to determine the income tax on pro-
jected future earnings is to engage in a most speculative activity. There are no firm
guidelines to follow. Idealism must therefore give way to practicality.
37. Compensatorily, the court noted the tax consciousness of the American public
and the general lack of knowledge about the exclusion, and went on to note that the
purpose of the instruction is to prevent improper increases in the award, by the jury,
because of a mistaken belief it would be taxable. The court's expedient consideration in
approving of the instruction was the absence of complications the instruction would en-
gender. Specifically, the court cited a number of things the instruction would not require;
no additional evidence; no reference to any Internal Revenue statutes or regulations; no
tax experts or tax tables; and no additional computations. 443 F.2d at 1251.
38. Feldman, supra note 7, at 276.
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plaintiff for these offsetting factors, albeit indirectly, an upper income
plaintiff should be equally entitled to receive such consideration.89
The principle expedient reason used to justify the gross income ap-
proach is the speculation argument. When the loss of earnings issue is
presented, this argument will undoubtedly arise. While distinguishing
the instruction and loss of earnings issues, the court in Domeracki will-
ingly noted that trying to estimate income tax liability might lead to
great conjecture at least insofar as prospective earnings were concerned.
When the issue is properly presented and the speculation argument
thoroughly explored the court will find persuasive authority to the con-
trary.40 The court in Domeracki also noted, expressly or inferentially,
that other problems might arise if evidence of plaintiff's income tax
liability were admitted: the possibility that the tax computaton might
completely overshadow the basic isues of liability and damages; and the
possibility that such evidence might complicate the case or confuse the
jury. The court also said that recovery for pain, suffering, and medical
expenses is not measured by income. None of these problems offer per-
suasive support for continued adherence to the gross income approach
to the loss of earnings isue.41
The proposition that the tax computation might completely over-
shadow the basic issues really overstates the matter. Undoubtedly con-
sideration of income tax liability would add another dimension to the
trial. It might require that the jury make an estimate of the tax liability
using prior income tax returns or information adduced from the plain-
tiff during the trial.42 It might even entail the use of an expert to aid
the court. Yet courts do not balk when it comes to plaintiff's use of
medical experts; nor do they hesitate when plaintiff uses experts to show
life or work expectancy, or to testify concerning reduction to present
worth of anticipated future earnings. 48 Plaintiff is allowed to prove
what he would have earned but for the injury. Equity and the com-
pensatory principle would require that defendant be allowed to prove
what part of that amount plaintiff would actually have received. Fidelity
to the compensatory theory of damages requires no less. The answer to
39. Cf. Comment, Damages-Refusal to Instruct Jury to Calculate Loss of Earnings
on the Basis of Net Income After Taxes, 14 VAND. L. Rav. 639, 642 (1961).
40. The weakness of this speculation argument has been discussed above. See notes
6-11 supra and accompanying text.
41. For a critical analysis of other reasons which have been advanced in support of
the gross income approach, see Feldman, supra note 7; Morris and Nordstrom, supra
note 10; Nordstrom, supra note 5.
42. See note 4 supra.
43. Morris and Nordstrom, supra note 10, at 277.
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the proposition that income tax evidence might complicate the trial is
that "such contention has the appeal of simplicity. It might aid the
judiciary but hardly justice. '"44 Of course, the argument that income tax
evidence might confuse the jury is not applicable when the trial is
conducted without one. Even where a jury is used, however, having it
hear evidence on plaintiff's income tax liability and to take it into
account when calculating the loss of earnings element, is hardly any
more confusing than other issues the jury considers. 45 Finally, as the
court noted, recovery for pain, suffering, and medical expenses is not
measured by income. This should not preclude admission of evidence
of plaintiff's income tax liability. Such evidence is not sought to be ad-
mitted for the purpose of affecting these elements. Its admission would
be for the sole purpose of limiting one element in the award formula,
loss of earnings, to actual loss. Certainly the court can make this ex-
plicitly clear to the jury when it is admited, and thus avoid any possi-
ble prejudice to the plaintiff.
It is suggested that when the court subsequently is presented with the
loss of earnings issue, adoption of a net income approach would be
appropriate. Judicial scrutiny of the expedient reasons which have been
advanced in support of the gross income rule will reveal their unper-
suasiveness. The only compensatory reason for adhering to a gross in-
come rule is that it provides indirect compensation for the several
factors which derogate from the award's compensatory purpose. If it is
desirable to compensate for these factors, direct provision should be
made since the use of a gross earnings approach is at best a poor sub-
stitute. The lost earnings or impaired earning capacity element varies so
greatly that consistently fair and accurate compensation for these factors
is not possible. The court should deal only with the factors it is willing to
recognize as compensable. If it views the loss of earnings issue in this
manner, the court should approve of a net earnings approach which, in
conjunction with the instruction which it has already approved, will aid
in rendering a still truer compensatory figure.
Francis R. Tunney, Jr.
44. Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 630 (D. S.C. 1967) (citation ommitted).
45. When the jury calculates the loss of earnings element in the award formula it
estimates what the plaintiff would have earned but for the injury. It would hardly be
more confusing to ask the jury to estimate what the plaintiff actually would have received.
Nor should the evidence of plaintiff's income tax liability, on which the jury would base
its calculation, be precluded because such evidence might be confusing. It is common
practice for juries to listen to expert medical testimony on anatomy, surgery and psychia-
try. Morris and Nordstrom, supra note 10, at 227. It is reasonable to assume that a sub-
ject as routine as income taxes would present fewer difficulties.
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